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BASIC ARKANSAS INTESTATE SUCCESSION, RIGHTS OF SURVIVING SPOUSES, AND
RELATED CURATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR LAWYERS AND LANDMEN
BY
J. MARK ROBINETTE JR.1
I. Introduction
Mineral interests may lay dormant for decades before becoming productive. In the interim,
however, the owners of these interests do not lay dormant. They live long lives, marry, have children,
and eventually, they die. Some of these persons have well-laid estate plans, know the nature and extent
of their property, and upon their departure to the hereafter, leave their affairs in meticulous order with no
question of who is entitled to what and where. Others depart this life leaving little more than a treasure
map and their descendants. Generations and many lines of persons descended from one severed mineral
owner repeat the cycle of life—marriage, children, and death with or without consideration for what
happens to their property upon their passing. Over many generations with such variations in the
handling of final affairs among members of a family, the ownership of the original mineral owner’s
interest today can resemble a bowl of spaghetti.
When confronted with such fragmented and splintered ownership, a lawyer or landman can
untangle a family history and determine the true owners of a severed interest by simply knowing the
basics of intestate succession, the rights of surviving spouses, and how to cure title issues generated by
by the former. These course materials are intended as a refresher course for lawyers and as a general
guide for landmen. This course will begin with an overview of intestate succession in Arkansas. Next,
this course will examine the dower rights of surviving spouses to the real estate of the intestate under
Arkansas law. Finally, this course will suggest curative techniques for problems encountered with
intestacy.
II. Intestate Succession
A. Identification of Intestates
To begin, it is necessary to identify whether someone is, in fact, an intestate. One is generally
said to be intestate when one dies without a will.2 This, however, is an oversimplified definition of
intestacy because intestacy can encompass more than just those dying without a will. In Arkansas, one
is intestate for failing to probate the will within the 5 year statute of limitation,3 not disposing of all
property in the will,4 leaving a child out of a will,5 and as to nonresidents with valid probates in other
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states, they are intestate relative to their Arkansas real property until somebody conducts an ancillary
probate in Arkansas.6
These are general statements, and there are some important finer points about the statute of
limitations to probate a will to address. Prior to 1949, there was no statute of limitation for probating a
will. With the passage of Act 140 of 1949, the legislature imposed a 5 year statute of limitations on all
wills, both of residents and non-residents. The legislature amended the law with Act 166 of 1963, which
added the provision in the current that allows probate of the wills of non-residents at any time if already
done so in their home jurisdiction. Cases interpreting the effect of these statutes create irreconcilable
problems. It is clear that non-residents who died between 1949 and 1963 with a valid probate in their
jurisdiction but no Arkansas probate are intestate with little hope of having their final wishes respected.7
What happens to the unprobated will of a non-resident who died prior to the 1949 statute change is less
certain. There is a 1951 case that allowed, in 1950, the probate of the will of a resident that died in
1935.8 The court held that the 1949 statute change was prospective only and that the law applicable at
the time of the deceased’s death (1935) applied.9 In 1961, the court, apparently oblivious to its prior
holding, held that the will of a non-resident who died in 1923 offered for probate in 1959 was subject to
the 1949 statute change (that is, the law had retrospective application) because the purpose of the law
change was to clear titles.10 It is not possible to conclusively determine that someone who died prior to
1949 with an unprobated will is an intestate. The only way to know for certain is to attempt to probate
the will. Most likely, if there is no party that wishes to object, the court will accept the will into probate.
B. Fundamentals of Intestate Succession
Once it is established that a person is an intestate, title passes to the intestate’s heir under the
applicable Table of Descents.11 Tables of Descents are statutory declarations directing the descent of the
property of the intestate. The law of intestate succession in effect at the time of the intestate’s death
governs.12 Prior to discussing Arkansas Tables of Descents, the reader should be familiar with some
basic terminology and principles that guide the flow of an intestate’s property through a Table of
Descents.
The first concept of intestacy is consanguinity. This term is a Latin-rooted word meaning “with
blood.” The English usage of the word essentially means “related by blood.” At common law,
consanguinity was the sole means to identify an intestate’s heirs. A common teaching device to
understand consanguinity is the Table of Consanguinity, pictured below.
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As the arrows on the table indicate, the intestate’s interest will descend down the table of
consanguinity to the intestate’s children and their descendants, or “issue.” Issue is a synonym for the
intestate’s children and descendants of the intestate’s children.13 Should the intestate have no issue, the
interest ascends back to the intestate’s parents. If the parents are deceased, the intestate’s interest jumps
up to the next level of consanguinity—the intestate’s siblings and their descendants. This process of
moving down and up the table of consanguinity repeats until the nearest living relatives of the intestate
emerge. Relatives beyond the line of an intestate’s grandparents are often called “laughing heirs”
because in all likelihood, they did not personally know the intestate and “laugh all the way to the
bank.”14 Many statutory schemes and the Uniform Probate Code seek to eliminate laughing heirs.15
Arkansas’s current scheme is not one of them, though it greatly reduces the already low probability of
inheritance by laughing heirs by heavily favoring a surviving spouse.16
13

BLACK’S, infra note 1 at 373.
WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. AND SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 59 (3d Edition Thomson-West 2004) (1987).
15
See Id.
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See Exhibit A, supra. The only instance where collateral heirs are favored over the spouse in the current Arkansas scheme
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Consanguinty provides a general direction of property flow, but it does not provide a means of
dividing the intestate’s property among the intestate’s heirs. Property divides among the intestate’s heirs
by two legal concepts rooted in the Latin language: per capita and per stirpes. The term per capita
literally means “by the person,”17 while per stirpes means “by the line.”18 At common law and under
Arkansas Statutes, per capita means that all members “of a class who inherit real or personal property
from an intestate…related to an intestate in equal degree…will inherit the intestate’s property in equal
shares.”19 Per stirpes inheritance at common law and under Arkansas Statutes occurs when “the
intestate is predeceased by one (1) or more person who would have been entitled to inherit from the
intestate had such a person survived the intestate.”20 To illustrate per capita inheritance, if A dies
intestate with children B, C, and D surviving him, then A’s property passes as follows:

Now suppose that B, C, and D have a brother E who predeceased them but who left two children, F and
G. In this instance, B, C, D, and E still take per capita, but E’s share flows per stirpes to his children F
and G, who are members of a class related in equal degree, so they take per capita. The following
diagram depicts this scenario.

17

BLACK’S, infra note 1 at 522.
Id. at 526.
19
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Id. at § 28-9-205(a)(1).
18

4

As final illustration of the concept, let us assume that F predeceased E and A, but left his children H, I,
and J. In this case, H, I, and J take F’s share per stirpes and it divides among them per capita. A
depiction of this scenario follows.

In addition to the general concepts of consanguinity, per capita, and per stirpes, there are
important miscellaneous legal principles that guide intestacy. While seeming to be a matter of common
sense, the identity of an intestate’s issue is sometimes a delicate matter. Naturally born21 and legitimate
children of the deceased are always entitled to take from an intestate.22 Adopted children are also
always included among a person’s intestate heirs.23 Illegitimate children, however, are treated vastly
different from either of the former classes of children. In the case of a mother giving birth to an
illegitimate child, that child will automatically take both from and through the mother.24 That is, all
property descending from the illegitimate child’s mother or mother’s family will go to the illegitimate
child. With regard to the father of the illegitimate child’s property, the illegitimate child will not take
from his or her father unless the illegitimate child files a claim against the father’s estate within 180 days
of the father’s death and meets a statutory evidentiary requirement.25
21

A trap for the unwary with regard to natural born children is ACA § 9-9-215, effective in 1977 which provides that a final
order of adoption terminates the right to inherit from a natural parent. This provision applies when the deceased dies after
1977. See Wheeler, 330 Ark. 728, 956 S.W.2d 863 (1997).
22
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-1-102(a)(1).
23
Id.
24
Id. at § 28-9-209(d). This is also true of all other past Arkansas intestate schemes.
25
Id. The statute requires an illegitimate child to present one of the following to establish paternity for purposes of inheriting
from the intestate father: “A court of competent jurisdiction has established the paternity of the child…; The man has made
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Another consideration of intestacy law is the distinction between ancestral property and new
acquisitions. This distinction is inapplicable to the current inheritance code, but should be considered
for older Arkansas intestate schemes. Ancestral property is real property that came from an intestate’s
ancestor “in consideration of blood and without a pecuniary equivalent” by “devise from a now dead
ancestor or by deed of actual gift from a living one.”26 A new acquisition, also termed “non ancestral
property,” is property acquired by any other means.27
The final miscellaneous consideration is the estate taken by intestate heirs. Under both the
current inheritance code and the historical schemes, the heirs of the intestate take as tenants in
common.28
C. Current and Former Arkansas Tables of Descent29
Due to the size of the intestacy law flow charts, they are attached and incorporated as Exhibits AD for intestate succession applicable from 1969 to present, 1933-1959, 1959-1969, and 1894-1933,
respectively.
D. Intestate Succession Hypotheticals
In all the following facts, every person who dies does so without a will, single, and without
children unless so stated. For each hypothetical, use the Tables of Descent flowcharts and your title
knowledge to determine the rightful heirs to SouthFork and the Ewing Estate, respectively, for the
current and each former Arkansas Table of Descent.
Facts: Ellie and Jock Ewing, residents of Arkansas married for more than 3 years, have three boys: J.R.,
Bobby, and Gary. Jock had a dalliance with an Air Corps nurse during the war and had an illegitimate
son, Ray. Ray has no proof he is Jock’s son other than stories from his mother. Among the real
property owned by Ellie and Jock is Southfork, which Ellie inherited as sole heir of Aaron Southworth.
She and her children are the last of the Southworth line but for Ellie’s first cousins John Smith who is a
cousin by Ellie’s father and Jackie Johnson, a cousin by Ellie’s mother. The Ewing Estate was owned
by the Ewing’s as tenants by the entirety as a new acquisition. Other than his immediate family, Jock has
one other living relative, his niece Jamie.

a written acknowledgment that he is the father of the child; The man's name appears with his written consent on the birth
certificate as the father of the child; The mother and father intermarry prior to the birth of the child; The mother and putative
father attempted to marry each other prior to the birth of the child by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law,
although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid; or The putative father is obligated to support the child under
a written voluntary promise or by court order.” This became the law by Act 1015 of 1979. For a recent examination of this
statute in a quiet title decree, see Defir v. Reed, 103 Ark. App. 319, 2008 WL 4735543 (2008). Prior to this act, the statutes
consistently required the illegitimate child of a father to marry the mother and recognize the child as his own. See A.S.A.
1947 § 61-103; Crawford and Moses § 3474 (1921); English 56:4-5. Alternatively, the child could be a product of a legally
defective marriage. Id.
26
Webb v. Caldwell, 128 S.W.2d 691, 694, 198 Ark. 331, 332 (1939).
27
Id.
28
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-207.
29
The author wishes to credit and express his gratitude to Mr. Grant M. Cox of Perkins & Trotter, PLLC for his assistance in
researching the historical Arkansas Statutes.
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Hypothetical #1: Jock dies tragically in the jungles of South America hunting down his latest oil
prospect. A year later, Ellie dies.
Hypothetical #2: J.R., Bobby, and Gary die in a helicopter crash over south Louisiana, but Jock survives
in the swamp for a few weeks before succumbing to starvation. Ellie moves on and marries Clayton
Farlow. Ellie dies intestate after being married to Clayton for over 3 years.
Hypothetical #3: Digger Barnes shows up drunk at the annual Ewing Barbeque, driving his shoddy old
car into Bobby, Gary, and J.R. killing them instantly. Consumed with anger, Ellie gets her gun, aims,
and shoots, but she missed Digger only to have the bullet ricochet and hit a propane tank which
exploded next to Ms. Ellie, killing her instantly. Stricken with grief and loneliness, Jock looks up his
old air corps nurse girlfriend. They reconcile, get married, and Jock finally acknowledges Ray as his son
in a heartfelt letter of reconciliation. Exactly 2 years and 364 days into the marriage with the nurse, Jock
dies of a heart attack after eating an entire 72 ounce steak in 1 hour at the Big Texan Steak Ranch in
Amarillo.30
Answers to Hypothetical #1
1969 to Present: Ray gets nothing because he has no qualifying proof paternity to Jock. Ellie’s heirs are
J.R., Bobby, and Gary per capita, giving them 1/3 of both SouthFork and the Ewing Estate each. The
fact that Southfork is the ancestral property of Ellie is irrelevant.
1959 to 1969: Same as 1933 to 1959.
1933 to 1959: Ray gets nothing because his mother never married Jock nor was there a legally deficient
attempted marriage between Nurse and Jock. Ellie’s heirs are J.R., Bobby, and Gary per capita, giving
them 1/3 of all of the property. The fact that Southfork is the ancestral property is not relevant because
Ellie died with issue.
1848 to 1933: Ray gets nothing because his mother never married Jock nor was there a legally deficient
attempted marriage between Nurse and Jock. Ellie’s heirs are J.R., Bobby, and Gary per capita, giving
them 1/3 of all of the property. The fact that Southfork is the ancestral property is not relevant because
Ellie died with issue.
Answers to Hypothetical #2
1969 to Present: Ray gets nothing because he has no qualifying proof his paternity to Jock. Clayton
Farlow gets all of Southfork and the Ewing Estate.
1959 to 1969: Same as 1933 to 1959.
1933 to 1959: Ray gets nothing because his mother never married Jock nor was there a legally deficient
attempted marriage between Nurse and Jock. Southfork ascends from Ellie up to her nearest collateral
heir on her father’s side as ancestral property. In this case, her first cousin John Smith takes all of
30

Those who dare undertake this spectacle of human gluttony can be viewed doing so online at
http://69.10.155.161:5080/maindining/
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SouthFork. The remainder of the Ewing estate also ascends to Ellie’s line, leaving John Smith and
Jackie Johnson each with 1/2 of the Ewing Estate.
1848 to 1933: Ray gets nothing because his mother never married Jock and there was no legally
deficient marriage to Jock. Southfork ascends from Ellie up to her nearest collateral heir on her father’s
side as ancestral property. In this case, her first cousin John Smith takes all of SouthFork. John is a
collateral heir from Ellie’s father’s line, so he takes all of the Ewing Estate as well.
Answers to Hypothetical #3
1969 to Present: Jock inherits Southfork from Ellie because they were married more than 3 years. If
Ray follows the statutory procedure proving he is Jock’s child, he gets Southfork and the Ewing Estate.
1959 to 1969: Same as 1933 to 1959. Were Ray not legitimated, however, he could take as Nurse’s heir
if she pre-deceased Jock.
1933 to 1969: Southfork ascends from Ellie up to her nearest collateral heir on her father’s side as
ancestral property. In this case, her first cousin John Smith takes all of SouthFork. Because Ray was
legitimated by his mother and Jock’s marriage, he gets the Ewing Estate to himself.
1848 to 1933: Southfork ascends from Ellie up to her nearest collateral heir on her father’s side as
ancestral property. In this case, her first cousin John Smith takes all of SouthFork. Because Ray was
legitimated by his mother and Jock’s marriage, he gets the Ewing Estate to himself.
II. Rights of Surviving Spouses
At common law, surviving spouses of the deceased received an interest in the estate of their
deceased spouse.31 The term “dower” at common law refers to the right of the wife to a life estate in the
land of her deceased husband, and the term “curtesy” at common law refers to the right of the husband
to a life estate in all of the lands of his deceased wife, provided that children were born into the
marriage.32 Today, statutes rather than common law govern the right of surviving spouses, but the
common law terminology persists.33 In Arkansas, most lawyers and judges refer to the surviving
spouse’s share as “dower” even though the surviving spouse may be male. This course will follow the
convention of Arkansas practitioners by using the term “dower” to refer to the rights of surviving
husbands and wives post 1981.
A. Identifying lands Subject to Dower or Curtesy
Regardless of whether the right is for the widow or the widower, when the surviving spouse was
in a valid marriage with the deceased spouse and the deceased spouse had seisen in the land during the

31

MCGOVERN AND KURTZ, infra note 9 at 137.
Id.
33
Arkansas struck down all surviving spouse statutes that had gender-biased relics from the common law in 1981.
32
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marriage, then the surviving spouse has a dower or curtesy right.34 The requirement of marriage
presents few pitfalls. Rare exceptions exist. For example, the marriage could be void for want of
capacity or legal defect.35 Seisen, the other prerequisite for dower, is a legal term of art meaning that the
owner had the right to possession of the land.36 Because it is a somewhat nebulous legal concept, there
are many reported cases that examine whether a spouse had seisen. Generally, seisen will not attach to
any remainder or reversion interest that does not consummate during the lifetime of the spouse holding
the remainder or reversion interest.37 For example, if A holds a life estate with a remainder to B who is
married to C, and B dies before A does, then B can never be seized of the land during his lifetime. Thus,
C has no right in the land. The same reasoning applies to reversions.38 Seisen will attach to an equitable
estate, including contracts to purchase land in which the deceased spouse had paid consideration.39
B. Amount of Dower/Curtesy
The amount of the surviving spouse’s rights varies between males and females over the course of
Arkansas’s history. Also, whether or not the deceased had children varies the amount of dower or
curtesy. The same definition and requirements of being a “child” under intestacy applies to the dower
requirement.40 Under current law (1981 to present), if the deceased spouse had children, the surviving
spouse gets a one-third life estate in all lands in which the deceased spouse had seisen during the
marriage.41 Should the deceased spouse die without children, differences between ancestral property
and new acquisitions come into consideration. For new acquisitions, the surviving spouse gets one half
of the lands in which the deceased spouse had seisen during the marriage in fee.42 The surviving spouse,
however, receives only a life estate in half of the lands for ancestral property.43
From 1939 to 1981, the law did not vary in substance from the current law with regard to
surviving spouses of intestates. The only difference was semantics. As in common law, the former law
labeled the share allotted the surviving husband as “curtesy” and the share allotted the wife as “dower.”
Prior to 1939, there were two schemes for the husband and one for the wife. From statehood to 1925,
the husband could receive common law curtesy.44 That is, a life estate in 100% of the wife’s lands
provided that any children were born to the marriage. In 1925, the legislature modified the common law
to provide the husband with a 1/3 life estate in the lands if the wife died with children and a 1/2 life
estate in the lands if the wife died without children.45 This changed to comport with the wife’s rights in
34

ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-301(a). A third requirement to impute is that the surviving spouse did not murder the deceased
spouse . Id. at § 28-11-204. This statutory provision has fact-specific exceptions set out in case law and should be researched
prior to making a determination of whether the slaying spouse and her heirs may have an interest.
35
See E.g. Spears v. Spears, 178 Ark. 720, 12 S.W.2d 875 (1928) (contest over whether subsequent marriage of deceases was
bigamous); another example might include marriage to a person under the disability of infancy.
36
BLACK’S, supra note 1 at 631.
37
Maloney v. McCullough, 215 Ark. 570, 221 S.W.2d 770 (1949).
38
Davis v. Davis, 219 Ark. 623, 243 S.W.2d 739 (1951).
39
Spalding v. Haley, 101 Ark. 296, 142 S.W. 172 (1911).
40
See E.g. Sanders v. Taylor, 193 Ark. 1095, 104 S.W.2d 797 (1937) (dower in fee under § 28-11-307 held inapplicable for
man who died with surviving adopted children). See also Section I(B), supra. By implication, the term “child or children” in
both §§ 28-11-307 and 28-11-301 should meet the same requirements as with intestate succession.
41
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-301(a).
42
Id. at § 28-11-307 (a)(1)
43
Id. at (b).
44
See Act 149 or 1925.
45
Id.
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1939. Dower for the widow was a 1/3 life estate in the husband’s lands from statehood to 1891
whereupon the widow began to receive dower in fee when her husband died without children.46 From
then, the provisions for the widow remained unchanged with the husband’s rights becoming equal to the
wife’s, as previously mentioned, in 1939.47
C. Extent and Nature of Dower Interest
The extent of dower is both far-reaching and durable.48 A spouse’s dower interest attaches to all
seized lands conveyed by the deceased spouse during the marriage to the surviving spouse.49
Furthermore, one spouse cannot unilaterally extinguish the other spouse’s dower rights by conveying the
land away without the other spouse’s consent.50 The non-consenting spouse may seek to recover lands
conveyed by the deceased spouse.51 The statutes bar the ability of the non-consenting spouse to recover
lands conveyed after the conveyance is of record for 7 years.52
Until consummated and assigned, dower is inchoate.53 The term “inchoate” means that
something is partially done or imperfect.54 For inchoate dower interests, an operator must impound 1/3
of the royalty for the surviving spouse and withhold royalty payments “until the rights of the surviving
spouse are determined.”55 Dower is not alienable in the lifetime of the seized spouse, but the unseized
spouse may relinquish dower rights during the lifetime of the seized spouse.56 To consummate dower,
the only requirement is the death of the seized spouse.57 Upon the death of the seized spouse, dower is
consummate, but unassigned.58 A spouse with a consummate, but unassigned dower interest conveys
no right to possession to a grantee.59 Such a grantee, however, does receive the spouse’s equitable right
to compel the heirs to assign the dower.60 The heirs of the intestate are under a duty to assign the
surviving spouse dower.61 Once assigned, the dower is perfected and carries the right to possession.62

46

See English’s Digest 59 and Act of March 24, 1891.
The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the equal treatment of surviving spouses of an intestate under the law from 1939
to 1981in Beck v. Merritt, 280 Ark 331, 657 S.W.2d 549 (1983).
48
Herein, the author will refer to the surviving spouse’s share generically as “dower.” The extent and nature of dower and
curtesy are the same.
49
Id. at § 28-11-301.
50
Id. at § 28-11-201(a).
51
See Id. and See also E.g. Roetzel v. Beal, 196 Ark. 5, 116 S.W.2d 591 (1938) (widow recovered her dower interest from
one purchasing the husband’s in interest at an execution sale). The exception to this is dower in fee, wherein the surviving
spouse’s right is immediately vested, making the surviving spouse a tenant in common with the heirs of the deceased. See
note 37, infra.
52
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-203.
53
See AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy §§ 32 and 34.
54
BLACK’S, infra note 1 at 337.
55
ARK. CODE ANN. at § 28-11-304. This section seeks to protect the surviving spouse until the assignment of dower, and
presumably, the Legislature’s intent is to encourage the heirs to assign the surviving spouse dower by directing the operator
to pay nothing to the heirs or spouse until the heirs make the assignment.
56
Le Croy v. Cook, 211 Ark. 966, 204 S.W.2d 173 (1947).
57
AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy § 34.
58
See AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy §§ 32 and 34.
59
See Barnett v. Meacham, 62 Ark. 313, 35 S.W. 533 (1896); Brinkley v. Taylor, 111 Ark. 305, 163 S.W. 521 (1914).
60
Weaver v. Rush, 62 Ark. 51, 34 S.W. 256 (1896); Baum v. Ingraham, 141 Ark. 243, 216 S.W. 704 (1919).
61
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-301(a).
62
AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy § 32.
47
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Prior to assigning the dower, the heirs must execute a written agreement giving the surviving
spouse the right to execute oil and gas leases and to receive all payments on any lease during the
surviving spouse’s lifetime.63 The assignment is a written instrument that describes the lands assigned
with the endorsed acceptance of the spouse and an acknowledgment from both spouse and heirs.64 The
assignment should be recorded with the probate clerk.65 The exception to assignment as a requirement of
perfection of dower interests is dower in fee when there are no children and the property is a new
acquisition.66 If the heirs fail to make the assignment, the surviving spouse may petition the court to
compel the heirs to assign dower.67 If the court cannot partition the land without great prejudice to
either party, then the court will either order the sale or rental of the land.68 An action to compel
assignment generally abates upon the surviving spouse’s death.69 When the surviving spouse dies, the
remainder to the dower interest passes by the deceased spouse’s will or by intestacy, whichever is
applicable.70
Dower in fee comes off the top of the intestate’s estate.71 Whatever is left after the dower share
is the “heritable estate.”72 Life estate dower is superior to the rights of the intestate’s heirs, but does not
actually reduce the heritable estate.73 This distinction is important in the current inheritance code which
provides that a surviving spouse of less than 3 years takes only one half of the “heritable estate.”74
D. Hypotheticals
Take the facts and Hypotheticals 1-3 from Section I(D) and determine the dower rights of each
surviving spouse under the current dower law. Also, determine the dower rights and intestate share of
the surviving spouse and the heirs in Hypothetical #2 under the current Table of Descent assuming
Clayton was married to Ellie for only 2 years and 364 days at her death.
Answer to Hypothetical #1: Trick question. Ellie and Jock held the Ewing Estate as tenants by the
entirety, so she had no need for dower in the Ewing Estate during the year she was widowed.
Answer to Hypothetical #2: Another trick question. Ellie has no descendants. Clayton owns
everything.

63

ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-302.
Id. at § 28-39-301(b).
65
Id. at (c).
66
Barton v. Wilson, 116 Ark. 400, 172 S.W. 1032 (1916).
67
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-303.
68
Id. at § 28-39-305 and 306.
69
Burrus v. Butt, 126 Ark. 584, 191 S.W. 33 (1917). (administrator of widow’s estate could not sue to recoup rents from
widow’s unassigned dower interest). The author was unable to find as Arkansas case stating whether a grantee of a surviving
spouse’s consummate, but unassigned dower interest. The reasoning of Burrus, however, seems applicable and appropriate
because the action could only be brought by the surviving spouse during the his or her lifetime, so it stands to reason a
grantee of the surviving spouse should be put in no better position.
70
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-301.
71
Id. at § 28-9-206(b)(1).
72
Id. at (c).
73
The author believes that the correct reading of § 28-9-206 is the “subject to” language means that life estate dower is
superior to the heir’s interest, and that the dower in fee provisions of § 28-11-307 reduce the intestate’s heritable estate.
74
Id. at § 28-9-214.
64
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Answer to Hypothetical #3: Nurse gets 1/3 of both SouthFork and the Ewing Estate for life (assuming a
court would—and it should—recognize Ray as Jock’s child).
Answer to Modified Hypothetical #2: A tricky, but not trick question. Remember that dower in fee
comes off the top of the estate, and that a surviving spouse gets ½ of the “heritable” estate under the
Tables of Descent. Clayton gets dower in fee of ½ of the Ewing Estate. The “heritable” estate is now ½
in fee. Clayton’s intestate share of Ewing Estate, then, is ½ of ½ or ¼. The remaining 1/4 of the Ewing
Estate goes in equal shares to Ellie’s cousins. As for SouthFork, it is ancestral property, and Clayton
gets a life estate in half as dower. Because his life estate does not actually reduce the “heritable” estate,
Clayton gets a full half of SouthFork under the Tables of Descent. Ellie’s cousins hold the remainder to
Clayton’s endowed life estate.75
III. Possible Curative Measures
A. Ancillary Probate
The Arkansas Code imposes a 5 year time limit on the probate of wills of residents, but for
nonresidents with estates probated in another state that met the time requirements of that state, there is
no time limit for ancillary administration in Arkansas.76 Until someone probates the will of a nonresident in Arkansas, the rights of the intestate heirs, not the will beneficiaries, are superior as to
Arkansas property.77 The language of the statute establishing this priority reads as follows:
[T]he rights and interests in the real property which, after the death of the testator if it is
assumed that he or she died intestate, have been acquired by purchase, as evidenced by
one (1) or more appropriate instruments which have been properly recorded in the office
of the recorder of the county in the which the real property situated and which would be
valid and effective had the decedent died intestate, shall not be adversely affected by the
probate of the will in this state after the expiration of the time limit imposed by
subsection (a) of this section.78
The subsection (a) referenced in the statute is the 5 year limit imposed on the probate of wills of
residents of Arkansas.79
The only case interpreting this statute is Cooper v. Tosco Corporation, 272 Ark. 294, 613
S.W.2d 831 (1981). In Cooper, the appellants, Cooper and Adams, were the beneficiaries of Rowland’s
will.80 Rowland died testate in 1966 in Louisiana, and his will was probated in 1968 in Louisiana.81
Under his will, Rowland did not leave his Arkansas real estate to his only child, Edith.82 Instead,

75

Arkansas abolished the ancestral/new acquisition distinction for purposes of intestacy only, not for dower. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 28 28-9-219.
76
See Id. at § 28-40-103 and Section I(B), infra.
77
Id.
78
Id. at § (c)(2).
79
Id. at § (a).
80
Cooper, 272 Ark. at 295, 613 S.W.2d at 831.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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Cooper and Adams were his devisees as to the Arkansas real estate.83 In 1979 only weeks before
Rowland’s will was offered for probate in Arkansas and more than 5 years after Rowland’s death, Edith
conveyed the minerals to the Arkansas property to her aunt Fahy.84 Cooper and Adams contended that
the above quoted statute implies that the purchaser must be a good faith purchaser without notice.85 The
court refused to impute “good faith purchaser without notice” into the statute and found that the deed to
aunt Fayh cut off the rights of the will devisees.86 In other words, it is a pure race to the courthouse.
Undoubtedly, aunt Fahy knew Edith had no right to the Arkansas property. Fayh’s full name
was Fayh Rowland,87 and she was probably the decedent’s sister or sister-in-law. The statute and the
case worked a rather unjust result, but both statute and case leave room for a future court to soften the
law under the right set of facts. For one, the Cooper court notes that neither Rowland nor Cooper
alleged fraud.88 Also, the language of the statute indicates that it should apply “if it is assumed that he
or she (the decedent) died intestate.” Perhaps “assumed” is synonymous with “presume.” A common
“curative” technique seen in Arkansas is simply to file the nonresident’s will or foreign probate of
record in the real estate records of the County of the situs of the property. It is possible that this would
serve to defeat the “assumption” that the decedent died intestate. This is entirely speculative, and it
would not serve clients very well to gamble on the court softening its interpretation of the statute in the
future. The only certain cure to a problem such as in Cooper is an ancillary probate.
Petitioning for ancillary probate is a relatively simple process.89 The petition should include an
authenticated copy of the will and order admitting the will to probate in the foreign jurisdiction.90 If
administration in the foreign jurisdiction is closed, the petition should also include a certified copy of the
final order distributing the estate.91 The will should be executed with two witnesses or be entirely in the
handwriting of and executed by the testator.92 If not, the petition should state the time and place of
execution and the testator’s domicile at the time of execution and of death.93 The attorney should file
the ancillary petition in the county of the greatest value of the testator’s property.94 If the probate needs
administration, then the petition to probate the will should also include a petition to appoint a personal
representative.95 A personal representative must furnish a fiduciary bond, or seek waiver from the
court.96
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 296, 831.
86
See Cooper 272 Ark. at 296-97, 613 S.W.2d at 832-33.
87
Id. at 295, 831.
88
Id. at 296, 831.
89
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-40-107 for the general requirements of the petition.
90
Id. at § 28-40-120.
91
This is not required by the statute, but it should be done where the estate is closed in the foreign jurisdiction so that the
Arkansas court and those searching real estate records have notice of the foreign court’s final judgment. This both hastens
the process and provides certainty.
92
Id. at §§ 28-40-120(c), 28-25-103, and 28-25-104
93
Id. at § 28-40-120(c).
94
Id. at §§ 28-40-120(d)(1) and 28-40-102.
95
The statutes do not require the appointment of a personal representative with the filing of the petition for probate. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-40-107. For an estate closed in another jurisdiction with no personal property to devise, there is no need for
the appointment of a personal representative unless a creditor comes forward who requires payment from the estate. In that
instance, the proponent can file a separate petition for to appoint a personal representative. The personal representative can
then do whatever is necessary with the estate property to satisfy the estate’s debts. For a probate currently under
84
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Lastly, the statutes require notice of the ancillary probate.97 This is the most time-consuming
aspect of probate. The statutes entitle all creditors and those with claims against the deceased to notice
of the probate.98 The administrator or proponent of the will (in the case of an estate without
administration) must publish notice of the probate once a week for two consecutive weeks in the
newspaper of general circulation in the county of the probate.99 The notice must state the date of the
administrator’s appointment, or if there is no administration, then the address of the will’s proponent and
attorney.100 The notice should substantially comply with the statutory form, include a statement to the
effect that all claims against the decedent and the estate be made in the time permitted by law, and a
statement that contest of the will must be filed in time permitted by law.101 In addition to the
publication, the statutes require that all persons whose names appear in the petition be served by regular
mail.102 One month following notice by publication, a notice to all outstanding creditors (if applicable)
should be served by registered mail or process server.103
For an estate long-closed in the foreign jurisdiction, the ancillary probate is simply a petition for
probate without petitioning for an administrator and a long wait for all notices to expire. Once the
applicable notice periods expire without claim or contest, the statutes bar all claims against the estate.104
In the interim, a lessee or purchaser from a will’s beneficiary should file a certified copy of the will and
order admitting the will to probate in all counties where he or she purchased or leased property from the
decedent in order to obtain the protection of the recording statutes. At the close of the estate, a certified
copy of the final order should also be filed of record in each county where the decedent had real
property. An example of a petition for ancillary probate with a personal representative is included as
Exhibit E. An example of an ancillary probate for an estate without administration is included as
Exhibit F.
B. The Affidavit of Death and Heirship
An affidavit of death and heirship is a legitimate means of evincing title to the interests of an
intestate. The affidavit, however, should contain all necessary information to apply the Arkansas Table
of Descents and ascertain the rights of the surviving spouse. The affidavit “should be made by a person
competent to testify in court” and “state facts rather than conclusions.”105 At a minimum, the substance
of the affidavit of death and heirship to cure the interests of an intestate should affirmatively state:106

administration in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign personal representative can petition to be the personal representative for
the ancillary proceeding, but the court will likely require a separate bond. See Id. at § 28-42-101 et. seq.
96
Id. at § 28-48-201.
97
Id. at §§ 28-40-120(d)(2) and 28-40-111.
98
Id. at § 28-40-111(a)(1)(A).
99
Id. at §§ 28-40-111(d)(1) and 28-1-112(b)(4)(A).
100
Id. at § 28-40-111(a)(1)(A) and (b).
101
ARK. CODE ANN. 28-40-111(c)(1-4), (a)(1)(A), and (a)(3).
102
Id. at § 28-112(b)(4)(B). A waiver of this requirement is common, and it is best practice to obtain written waivers from the
will beneficiaries prior to filing the petition to file them with the petition.
103
Id. at §§ 28-40-111(a)(4)(A) and 28-1-112(b)(1-3).
104
Id. at § 28-40-111(a)(1)(A). This represents the point at which title is clear if there were no claims against the estate and
there was no contest of the probate.
105
ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARD FOR EXAMINATION OF REAL ESTATE TITLES IN ARKANSAS 26 (2000).
106
Id.
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1. That the decedent died intestate;
2. When and where the decedent died;
3. The relationship, if any, of the affiant to the decedent and the source of knowledge concerning
the decedent;
4. The marital status of the decedent at the time of death, name of surviving spouse, and the
duration of the marriage up to the time of the intestate’s death;
5. If the spouse predeceased the intestate, then the time and place of the spouse’s death;
6. Whether the intestate had children;
7. The names of all natural or adopted children of the intestate;
8. If there are no children or a surviving spouse of more than 3 years, then all other all other
information necessary to determine the decedent’s heirs-at-law in accordance with the applicable
Arkansas Tables of Descent;
9. The same information set out in items 1-8 regarding any deceased child, grandchild, or other
applicable descendent.
The affidavit should be sworn and acknowledged by a notary.107 Details are important in drafting an
affidavit of death and heirship. The draftor should obtain all possibly relevant information about the
intestate and review it carefully prior to drafting the affidavit. A sample affidavit for the current
intestacy scheme (1969 to present) based on the facts and hypothetical #2 in Section I(D) is attached as
Exhibit G. Note that the information included in this sample affidavit differs from what one might
include for an affidavit for either of the other intestate schemes.
Affidavits are merely evidentiary in Arkansas.108 To conclusively “prove” heirship for an intestate, a
person claming an interest to the property can file an action for Determination of Heirship.109
C. The Affidavit for Collection of Small Estates
The Affidavit of Collection of Small Estates is a very streamlined, inexpensive process for
estates with a value, excluding homestead of and statutory allowances for spouse and minor children, of
$100,000.110 The estate must not have a personal representative or have an application pending for the
appointment of a personal representative, and 45 days must have elapsed since the decedent’s death.111
If the estate meets all prerequisites, any distributee of the estate may file an affidavit with the probate
clerk of the circuit court setting forth:
1. That there are no unpaid claims or demands against the decedent or his or her estate, that the
Department of Human Services furnished no federal or state benefits to the decedent, or, that if
such benefits have been furnished, the department has been reimbursed in accordance with state
and federal laws and regulations;
107

Id.
ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION at 25, infra note 55.
109
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-83-101. This action is a species of declaratory judgment, but it allows any interested person to file
the action without having to alleging the how the petitioner’s interest might be harmed.
110
Id. at § 28-41-101(a)(3). The cost to file the affidavit is only $25. Id. at § 28-41-101(b)(1).
111
Id. at (a)(1-2).
108
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2. An itemized description and valuation of the personal property and a legal description and
valuation of any real property of the decedent, including the homestead;
3. The names and addresses of persons having possession of the personal property and the names
and addresses of any persons possessing or residing on any real property of the decedent; and
4. The names, addresses, and relationship to the decedent of the persons entitled to and who will
receive the property.112
The distributee should also attach a copy of the decedent’s will.113 The distributee files the affidavit
with the clerk, and the clerk provides a certified copy of the affidavit to “any person owing any money,
having custody of any property, or acting as registrar or transfer agent of any evidence of interest,
indebtedness, property, or right” of the estate.114 To distribute real property, the statute gives the
distributee the option to publish notice to creditors of the estate containing the following information:
1. The name of the decedent and his or her last known address;
2. The date of death;
3. A statement that the affidavit was filed, the date of the filing, and a legal description of all real
property listed in the affidavit;
4. A statement requiring all persons having claims against the estate to exhibit them, properly
verified, within three (3) months from the date of the first publication of the notice, or they shall
be forever barred and precluded from any benefit in the estate;
5. The name and mailing address of the distributee or his or her attorney; and
6. The date the notice was first published.115
The distributee should publish notice of the collection once a week for two consecutive weeks in the
newspaper of general circulation in the county of the probate.116 In addition to publication, the statutes
require that all persons whose names appear in the petition be served by regular mail.117 Once the notice
period is complete, the distributee may issue him or herself an administrator’s deed.118

112

See Id. at (a)(4)(A-D)
Though not explicitly required, it is an implied requirement if the affidavit seeks to prove devise by will rather than
intestacy. Also, the statute provides that there be no additional charge for attaching the will. Id. at (b)(1).
114
Id. at (a)(5).
115
Id. at (b)(2)(A-B).
116
See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-40-111(d)(1) and 28-1-112(b)(4)(A).
117
Id. at § 28-1-112(b)(4)(B).
118
Id. at § 28-42-102(d).
113
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The real estate bar holds the Affidavit for Collection of Small Estates in great suspicion.119 The
real estate bar’s concerns are valid. The courts, however, finally had the opportunity to review the Small
Estates statute in Osborn v. Bryant.120 In that case, the decedent, Lacy Bryant, died testate with a widow
and eight children as a resident of Jackson County, Arkansas.121 Lacy’s will left his real property to his
wife for life, and following that, the will gave the option to purchase the property for $200 per acre to
Osborn with the proceeds to go to Lacy’s children.122 If Osborn failed to exercise the option, the
property went straight to Lacy’s children.123 Osborn filed the affidavit along with Lacy’s will.124 The
will was in all respects valid, and had proof of execution.125 Osborn also followed the notice procedure
in the statute.126 Following the notice period, Osborn executed an administrator’s deed to herself.127
Lacy’s widow lived on the property for 9 years following the deed.128 After the widow’s death, Lacy’s
children filed a declaratory judgment action against Osborn to nullify the administrator’s deed and to
declare that Lacy died intestate.129
Lacy’s children argued that the Small Estates procedure was a “probate proceeding” under ACA
§ 28-40-104 and that the will attached to the affidavit could therefore not be used as evidence of
devise.130 The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the statute exempts the Small Estates
procedure from § 28-40-104.131
This case is from the Arkansas Court of Appeals, not Arkansas Supreme Court, so the
precedential value of the case is limited. Aside from the explicit holding that § 28-4-104 does not apply
to the Small Estates procedure, the important implied holding of the case is that where the distributee
follows the statutory notice procedures, the administrator’s deed is good to transfer title.132 The case,
however, leaves a number of important issues unresolved. First, the court in Osborn held that any will
could be valid to prove title with the Small Estates procedure, but it is unknown if the Arkansas
Supreme Court would agree that all wills, either in perfect compliance with the wills statutes or noncompliant, are entirely exempt from the requirements of 28-40-104(b)(2)133 under the Small Estates
Procedure. Secondly, the opponents of the affidavit in the Osborn case did not argue that the adequacy
of the notice employed by the distributee.134 Generally, courts reviewing statutory procedures require
strict compliance with the statute, and any substantial and sometimes minute defect will result in failure
119

ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION, infra note 55 at 29. “Despite their statutory recognition in Ark. Code Ann. § 28-41-101 et.
seq., Affidavits for Collection of Small Estates do not, in and of themselves, pass title to real estate, and should be given no
greater weight or credibility than any other affidavit.”
120
No. CA 08-589, 2009 WL 215480 (Ark. App. Jan. 14, 2009).
121
Id. at *1.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Osborn, 2009 WL 215480 at *1.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at *2.
131
Id. at *3.
132
See Osborn, 2009 WL 215480.
133
“Except as provided in § 28-41-101, to be effective to prove the transfer of any property…, a will must declared valid by
an order of probate by the circuit court, except a duly executed and unrevoked will which has not been probated may
admitted as evidence of devise.”
134
See Osborn, 2009 WL 215480.
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of the statutory procedure.135 We do not know what, if any, defects in the notice procedure will cause
the courts to render the Affidavit invalid. Finally, with an out-of-state decedent, it is somewhat
uncertain whether it is possible to use the procedure to avoid the application of Cooper.136 To obtain the
protection against conveyances by rogue heirs, Cooper makes it clear that the statute requires a
“probate” of a non-resident’s will.137 The legislature provides that the will of a non-resident may be
admitted to probate in this jurisdiction if probated in the decedent’s home jurisdiction in a timely
manner.138 The question remains whether the Small Estates procedure is a “probate.” If not, then only
an ancillary probate can extend protection against conveyances of rogue heirs. If, however, the Court of
Appeals is correct in its interpretation of § 28-40-104, then the only means to harmonize the exemption
of the Small Estates procedure in §§ 28-40-104(b)(2) and 28-40-104(a)139 is to classify a will attached to
the Affidavit as a “will admitted to probate.” This would extend protection to the devisees of the will.
Without a binding precedent from the Arkansas Supreme Court on the issues of compliance with
the wills statute, effectiveness of notice, and the effectiveness on the wills of out of state decedents, the
Small Estates procedure presents appreciable risk of litigation. Those wishing to use the procedure to
cure mineral titles should carefully consider the risk of litigation versus the cost savings of using the
procedure.

135

See E.g. First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 373 Ark. 470, 3009 WL 2132288 (2008) (strict compliance applied to
statute dealing with notice of forfeiture of bail bond); Hervey v. the Farms, Inc., 252 Ark. 881, 481 S.W.2d 348 (1972) (strict
compliance applied to notice of garnishment statute); Eddins v. Style Optics, Inc., 71 Ark. App. 102, 35 S.W.2d 315 (2000)
(strict compliance to procedural requirement of probate statute applied); Books-A-Million, Inc. v. Arkansas Painting and
Specialties Co., 340 Ark. 467, 10 S.W.3d 857 (2000) (strict compliance applied to notice of mechanic lien staute); Swartz v.
Drinker, 192 Ark. 198, 90 S.W.2d 483 (1936) (strict compliance applied to statute governing notice to out of state defendant
for quiet title suit).
136
See Section III(A), infra.
137
See Id.
138
Id.
139
“No will shall be effectual for the purpose of proving title to or the right to the possession of any real or personal property
disposed of by the will until it has been admitted to probate.” (emphasis added). The same statute also provides that “[t]he
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) [sic] of this section shall be supplemental to existing laws relating to the time limit for
probate of wills, and the effect of unprobated wills, and shall not be construed to repeal §28-40-103 and subsection (a) of this
section or any other law not in direct conflict herewith.” Id. at § c. The statute is ambiguous in that it places the exemption
for Small Estates in section b, but states that nothing in section b may be construed to repeal section a. This is antithetical,
and the Small Estate exemption should appear in section a to support the Court of Appeal’s reading of the statute. The Court
of Appeals does not note this, choosing to read sections a, b, and c independently. Curiously, there appears to be an error in
section c where it refers to itself—the construction provision—as not changing itself. Perhaps there is a more substantial
error or omission in the statute not identified by the Code Revision Commission.
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Exhibit A: Table of Descent 1969 to Present

Exhibit B: Table of Descent 1959-1969

Exhibit B: Table of Descent 1959-1969 (cont)

1-The language of the statute in effect is “heir.” Presumably, this would include any heir of the spouse and not just descendants.

Exhibit C: Table of Descent 1933-1959

Exhibit C: Table of Descent 1933-1959 (cont)

Exhibit D: Table of Descent 1848-1933

Exhibit D: Table of Descent 1848-1933 (cont)

Exhibit E: Petition for Ancillary Probate with Administration
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WHITE COUNTY, ARKANSAS

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN ROSS “JOCK” EWING,
DECEASED

No. 2009C-001

PETITION FOR ANCILLARY PROBATE OF WILL AND APPOINTMENT OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

Ellie Ewing, whose address is P.O. Box 123, South Fork, Texas, 73020, and
whose interest in the estate of the above-decedent is that of devisee and surviving spouse,
prays by and through her undersigned counsel, that a certain written instrument be
admitted to probate as the Last Will of the decedent, and to appoint petitioner as personal
representative. The facts, so far as they are known to or can reasonably be ascertained by
petitioner, are:
a. Decedent: The decedent, John Ross “Jock” Ewing, aged 79 years, who resided at
the South Fork Ranch, South Fork, Texas, died at Cook Forth Worth Hospital, on
March 25, 1985. Decedent owned certain real property located in White County,
Arkansas.
b. Proffered Will: The decedent left as his Last Will an instrument dated October 5,
1979, executed in Texas in accordance with Texas law.

Due proof of the

execution thereof in the manner required by law is made by notarized attestation
clause in the decedent’s Last Will.

c. Surviving Spouse, Heirs, and Devisees: The surviving spouse, heirs, and devisees
of the decedent, and their respective ages, relationships to the decedent, and
residence addresses are as follows:

Name
Ellie Ewing

Age
Adult

Relationship
Surviving Spouse

Address
South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

J.R. Ewing

Adult

Son

South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

Bobby Ewing

Adult

Son

South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

Gary Ewing

Adult

Son

South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

d. Value of Estate: The probable value of the estate of the decedent is as follows:
i. Real Property:

Undetermined

ii. Personal Property:

Undetermined

e. Bond and Person to be Appointed: Your petitioner has been nominated in the
decedent’s Last Will to serve as Executrix, without bond, to administer the estate.
All distributees are competent, have filed herein their written waivers of bond,
their consent to appointment of Ellie Ewing as personal representative, there are
no known unsecured claims against the estate, and the requirement for a fiduciary
bond should be excused.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays this Court enter an Order determining the fact of the
death of the decedent, that the proffered instrument was executed in all respects
according to law when the testator was competent to do so and acting without undue

influence, fraud, or restraint, has not been revoked, and is the decedent’s Last Will, and
appointing the foregoing nominee to administer the estate of the Decedent.

Respectfully submitted,
Attorney
By: ______________________________________
Attorney, Bar No. 1234567
Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION
I, Ellie Ewing, Petitioner in the hereinabove entitled matter, do hereby swear,
affirm and verify that I have read the entire Petition set forth above and I do hereby
swear, affirm and verify that the allegations contained therein are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief.

___________________________________
Ellie Ewing

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF TARRANT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of ______, 200_.

___________________________________
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:______________
-seal-

Exhibit F: Petition for Ancillary Probate without Administration
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WHITE COUNTY, ARKANSAS

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN ROSS “JOCK” EWING,
DECEASED

No. 2009C-001

PETITION FOR ANCILLARY PROBATE OF WILL WITHOUT
ADMINISTRATION

Ellie Ewing, whose address is P.O. Box 123, South Fork, Texas, 73020, and
whose interest in the estate of the above-decedent is that of devisee and surviving spouse,
prays by and through her undersigned counsel, that a certain written instrument be
admitted to probate as the Last Will of the decedent, without appointment of personal
representative or administration of estate. The facts, so far as they are known to or can
reasonably be ascertained by petitioner, are:
a. Decedent: The decedent, John Ross “Jock” Ewing, aged 79 years, who resided at
the South Fork Ranch, South Fork, Texas, died at Cook Forth Worth Hospital, on
March 25, 1985. Decedent owned certain real property located in White County,
Arkansas.
b. Proffered Will: The decedent left as his Last Will an instrument dated October 5,
1979, executed in Texas in accordance with Texas law.

Due proof of the

execution thereof in the manner required by law is made by notarized attestation
clause in the decedent’s Last Will.

c. Surviving Spouse, Heirs, and Devisees: The surviving spouse, heirs, and devisees
of the decedent, and their respective ages, relationships to the decedent, and
residence addresses are as follows:

Name
Ellie Ewing

Age
Adult

Relationship
Surviving Spouse

Address
South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

J.R. Ewing

Adult

Son

South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

Bobby Ewing

Adult

Son

South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

Gary Ewing

Adult

Son

South Fork Ranch,
South Fork Texas

d. Value of Estate: The probable value of the estate of the decedent is as follows:
i. Real Property:

Undetermined

ii. Personal Property:

Undetermined

e. Title to Property:

The decedent’s will should be admitted to probate as a

muniment of title for the sole purpose of showing record title to the following
described real property:
An undivided one half mineral interest to the SE/4 SE/4, Section 11, Township 12
North, Range 13 West, Searcy County, Arkansas.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays this Court enter an Order determining the fact of the
death of the decedent, that the proffered instrument was executed in all respects
according to law when the testator was competent to do so and acting without undue
influence, fraud, or restraint, has not been revoked, and is the decedent’s Last Will, that
there is no necessity for the appointment of a personal representative, or for

administration of the estate of the decedent; and admitting the decedent’s Will to probate
in Arkansas for the sole purpose of showing record title to the property described herein.

Respectfully submitted,
Attorney
By: ______________________________________
Attorney, Bar No. 1234567
Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION
I, Ellie Ewing, Petitioner in the hereinabove entitled matter, do hereby swear,
affirm and verify that I have read the entire Petition set forth above and I do hereby
swear, affirm and verify that the allegations contained therein are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief.

___________________________________
Ellie Ewing

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF TARRANT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of ______, 200_.

___________________________________
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:______________
-seal-

Exhibit G: Sample Affidavit of Death and Hership
AFFIDAVIT OF DEATH AND HEIRSHIP FOR ELLIE EWING
Comes John Smith, who swears and deposes:
1.
2.
3.

4.

My name is John Smith. I was well-acquainted with Ellie Ewing for 25 years, being Ellie Ewing’s
first cousin.
Ellie Ewing died intestate on June 22, 1988, at South Fork, Arkansas.
Ellie Ewing was married twice in her lifetime. First to Jock Ewing. Ellie and Jock were married
38 years. Jock died March 1, 1983. Ellie then married Clayton Farlow on June 1, 1984. Ellie and
Clayton were still married at the time of Ellie’s death.
Ellie had three children with Jock: Gary Ewing, J.R. Ewing, and Bobby Ewing. All three of
Ellie’s children by Jock died in a helicopter crash on February 9, 1983. Ellie had no children with
Clayton Farlow. Ellie had no adopted children.

Further, I sayeth not.

____________________________
John Smith
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF ARKANSAS
COUNTY OF PULASKI

)
) SS
)

On this __________ day of __________________________, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a
Notary Public and for the County and State aforesaid, duly commissioned and acting appeared in person the
within named John Smith, to me known to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing
document who swears that the statements made therein are true to the best of his knowledge and that he
executed the same for the purposes therein mentioned and set forth.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and seal on the date and year as stated
hereinabove.

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

